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Abstract— Recent advances in communication networks and
cryptographic techniques have made possible to consider on-
line voting systems as a feasible alternative to conventional
elections. Until today several protocols for electronic voting have
been proposed, unfortunately only a few of them have been
implemented in an end-to-end fully functional system. In this
paper we present a secure electronic voting system for medium
scale on-line elections (SELES). Our system efficiently imple-
ments a security communication protocol offering protection
against double voting and others frauds while avoiding any
private voting channel. SELES accomplishes all the standard
properties of conventional voting systems, namely, accuracy,
democracy, privacy, verifiability, simplicity, flexibility and double
voting detection. Our system has been tested in a distributed
and heterogeneous Internet network comprised by workstations,
laptops and PDA nodes interacting through wired and wireless
connections. Additionally, SELES has been designed to deal
with communication failures, thus achieving a certain degree of
robustness.
Keywords: Electronic voting, Cryptography, Blind Signatures,
DSA, RSA.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an electronic election system, privacy and security are
mandatory features. However, it is not always obvious how to
achieve these characteristics at a reasonable price, due to the
fact that when an election process takes place, mechanisms
that assure both, security and privacy may be too expensive
for system administrators on one side, and inconvenient for
users on the other.
Recent advances in communication networks and crypto-
graphic techniques have made possible to consider on-line
voting as a feasible alternative to conventional elections.
Indeed, on-line electronic voting allows users to participate
in an election no matter where they physically are at the
moment of the voting process provided that they have a means
of establishing a wired or wireless Internet connection to the
system servers.
Additionally, an aggregated value of this kind of systems
is its inherent privacy, since a voter can participate actively
within an election process without being seen by anyone.
Notice that it would be almost impossible to achieve this
feature when using a traditional election system.
Creating an on-line voting system requires the use of robust
security mechanisms that are relatively complex to design.
Accordingly, the study of security mechanisms in electronic
elections has received considerable attention in the last twenty
years. As a result, a wide variety of e-voting cryptographic
protocols have been proposed [1], [2], [4], [7], [10], [12],
[15], [16]. Such protocols must satisfy a number of security
requirements such as: vote accuracy, verifiability, voters’ pri-
vacy, double voting detection, among others [12], [15].
Roughly speaking, those cryptographic protocols can be
classified as the ones based on Homomorphic functions, and
the ones based on Blind signatures.
The design of protocols based on homomorphic functions,
requires rather complicated encryption schemes for hiding
ballot’s content in order to preserve voters’ privacy [6], [16].
Those protocols include two phases: ciphering and voting. To
implement these phases, several techniques such as shared
secret keys and zero-knowledge proofs have been proposed.
However, an important drawback of homomorphic protocols
is that they tend to produce high communication overhead
along with having high computational complexity in the vote
counting phase.
Blind Signatures were proposed in 1983 by Chaum [1].
Protocols based on blind signatures hide voter’s identity, but
still make the actual content of a vote visible to the authority.
Protocols based on blind signatures generally consist of a
registration phase followed by a voting phase.
In this paper we present an RSA/DSA-based e-voting
protocol for online elections which can be regarded as an
improvement of the scheme proposed in [10]. As a means of
testing the correctness of the said protocol, we implemented a
fully-functional distributed e-voting system in Java. We give
a detailed explanation of the e-voting system’s architecture
and its corresponding dataflow. Finally, we evaluate the per-
formance achieved by our system and compare it with other
previously reported schemes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In next
Section, a summary of previous related work is outlined.
In Section III, a description of the SELES protocol which
is an improved version of Lin–Hwang–Chang’s protocol is
presented. Section IV discusses the rationale and implemen-
tation details behind the general architecture of the system
developed. A performance and comparison evaluation of the
system is presented in Section V. Finally, in Section VI some
concluding remarks are drawn.
II. RELATED WORK
Fujioka et al. [4], developed a practical voting scheme using
blind signatures. In their proposal, each voter signs his/her
vote with a secret key, and then sends it to the counting
center through an anonymous channel. One disadvantage of
this scheme is that the protocol is complex since the voting
phase consists of two steps.
In 1997, L. Cranor and R. Cytron [2] proposed and imple-
mented a protocol based on Fujioka’s scheme called Sensus.
The main difference between both schemes is that Sensus
allowed users to vote in a single session, whereas Fujioka’s
proposal required two sessions. However, one disadvantage of
these schemes is that the network traffic increases since the
voter is required to send the same ciphered messages twice,
making the protocol less efficient.
On the contrary, in Wen-Sheng et al. scheme [8], the
network traffic is lower since every voter is allowed to send
only a single anonymous message. Unfortunately, it has been
shown that this scheme does not avoid vote duplication.
In 1998, Mu and Varadharajan [12] proposed two security
schemes for electronic voting that addressed the issue of
voter’s privacy. The proposed schemes made use of RSA
blind signatures along with ElGamal encryption scheme. These
protocols were also able to detect vote duplicity.
In 1999, Karo and Wang [9] presented a security scheme
for large scale electronic elections that did not used blind
signatures. They suggested to utilize the HTTPS protocol to
perform all transactions, instead of using an anonymous chan-
nel. However, the scheme was inefficient since six authorities
were included in the model.
In 2001, Ray – Narasimhamurthi [13] designed a protocol
that allowed anonymous voting through the internet. This
protocol included three authorities and made use of digital
certificates for voter authentication.
In 2003, Joaquim, Zu´quete and Ferreira [7] presented a Java
implementation of an electronic voting system called REVS.
REVS implementation was based on the scheme proposed by
DuRette [3], which was itself an improvement of the EVOX
system described by Herschberg [5]. In REVS, every valid vote
should contain t signatures from the n administrative entities,
where: t > n2 .
In 2003, Chien et al. and Lin–Hwang–Chang [10] showed
one weakness in the scheme proposed by Mu and Varadhara-
jan: the possibility that a user could vote more than once
without being detected. Lin–Hwang–Chang also presented in
[10] an improvement to Mu and Varadharajan’s protocol,
adding a protection scheme against possible frauds based on
the use of blind signatures. The proposed scheme did not
require any special voting channel.
Finally in 2005, Garcı´a-Zamora et al. [17] incorporated two
amendments to the Lin–Hwang–Chang protocol in order to
further improve its functionality. First, the usage of ElGamal
encryption scheme in [10] was substituted by the Digital
Signature Algorithm (DSA) scheme. By doing so, authors
in [17] shown that independently of the random values that
a voter and an authority server may choose, a vote will
always be signed correctly before being sent to the voting
server. Secondly, two extra encryption operations were added
to the protocol dataflow in order to guarantee proper operation.
A detailed description of this protocol is given in the next
Section.
III. SELES VOTING PROTOCOL
SELES voting protocol consists of three phases: authentica-
tion, voting and counting. It considers the interaction of four
entities, namely, voter (V), authentication server (AS), voting
server (VS), and counting server (TCS). Cryptographic tools
used by the protocol include digital certificates, time stamps,
blind signatures and so on.
The notation that will be used to describe protocol’s oper-
ation is as follows:
• V : voter
• AS: authentication server
• VS: voting server
• TCS: counting server
• t : time stamp
• q : DSA parameter, 2159 < q < 2160
• p : given l such that 0 ≤ l ≤ 8, let p be a prime such
that 2511+64l < p < 2512+64l, with the property that q
divides (p− 1), i.e, q|(p− 1).
• g : a generator for Z∗p
• a : DSA private key 1 ≤ a ≤ q − 1
• α = g(p−1)/q mod p
• y = αa mod p
• Cert: digital certificate issued by an authority
• {ex, dx}, nx: a pair of RSA keys for user x, where nx =
p1 × p2, p1 and p2 two large primes and ex × dx mod
φ(nx) = 1
In the rest of this Section, we summarize the main algorithm
steps and dataflow performed during all three protocol phases.
A. Authentication
The authentication phase consists of three steps:
1) Voter chooses two blind factors b1 and b2, and two
random numbers k1 and a. Using these values together
with the DSA parameters, the values y, z1 and z2 are
generated in the following way:
y = αa mod p,
z1 = [(αa mod p) · (beAS1 )] mod nAS , (1)
z2 = [(αk1 mod p) · (beAS2 )] mod nAS .
where p and α are public DSA domain parameters.
Then the voter sends,
{V,AS,CertV , t, z1, z2, [(z1‖z2‖t)dV mod nV ]}, to the
AS.
2) AS validates V’s identity by verifying the received
signature [(z1‖z2‖t)dV mod nV ] with the public key
included in CertV . If the signature is valid, AS chooses
a random number k2 and stores it in the database as an
identification of V. For this reason the value k2 must be
unique for each voter. Then AS generates z3, z4, z5 and
z6 using the following procedure:
z3 = (k2‖t)eV mod nV ,
z4 = (z1 ×AS)dAS mod nAS
= [(αa mod p)×AS]dASb1 mod nAS
z5 = (z2 × (αk2 mod p)×AS)dAS mod nAS
= [(αk1 mod p)× (αk2 mod p)×AS]dASb2
modnAS (2)
z6 = (z22 × (αk2 mod p)×AS)dAS mod nAS
= [(α2k1 mod p)× (αk2 mod p)×AS]dASb22
modnAS
Finally, AS sends a reply message to V. Notice that in
this message the values z4, z5 and z6 are encrypted with
V’s public key, separately. Additionally, a timestamp t is
added to the message. This is because it is not possible
to encrypt all three values together, since the size will
be 3072 bits and the size of nV is only 1024 bits long.
{AS, V, z3, [(z4 + t)eV mod nV ], [(z5 + t)eV mod
nV ], [(z6 + t)eV mod nV ]}
3) The voter decrypts z3 to get k2. Additionally, he/she
decrypts z4, z5 and z6 using his/her private exponent
dV to decrypt the last three values in the reply message
followed by the subtracting of t. Then, the blind factors
are removed so that the signatures s1, s2 and s3 can be
generated as follows,
s1 = z4 × b−11
= [(αa mod p)×AS]dAS mod nAS
s2 = z5 × b−12
= [(αk1 mod p)× (αk2 mod p)×AS]dAS
modnAS (3)
s3 = z6 × b−22
= [(α2k1 mod p)× (αk2 mod p)×AS]dAS
modnAS
B. Voting Phase
Voting phase dataflow is as described below.
1) Let us recall that VS needs to verify:
• 2 voter’s signatures of the vote m generated using
DSA module q and;
• 3 signatures module nAS , which are the signatures
that the AS previously provided to the voter.
Therefore, in the voting phase the voter proceeds to sign
the ballot (m) using DSA and x1 and x2 as private keys.
The voter is able to generate these values because he/she
has already decrypted k2. Notice that the two DSA
signatures consists on the pairs (r1, s4) and (r2, s5).
Hence, the first part of the signatures, namely r1 and
r2, can be obtained as follows,
x1 = k1 + k2,
x2 = 2k1 + k2,
r1 = (αx1 mod p) mod q, (4)
r2 = (αx2 mod p) mod q.
The second part of the signatures, namely s4 and s5, can
be generated through the computation of the following
equations:
s4 = x−11 (m+ ar1) mod q,
s5 = x−12 (m+ ar2) mod q. (5)
Additionally the voter needs to compute the values l1
and l2 as,
l1 = [((αk1 mod p) mod nAS)× ((αk2 mod p)
modnAS)] mod nAS ,
l2 = [((αk1 mod p)2 mod nAS)× ((αk2 mod p)
modnAS)] mod nAS . (6)
These last two values together with r1 and r2 are
encapsulated taking advantage of the Chinese Residue
Theorem. That is done with the goal of allowing VS
to perform the corresponding verifications in the proper
arithmetic (either modulus nAS or modulus q).
pr1 = [(r1 × nAS) + (l1 × q)] mod (nAS · q)
pr2 = [(r2 × nAS) + (l2 × q)] mod (nAS · q)
(7)
Lastly, the voting ticket is generated in the following
way:
Ticket = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, y, pr1, pr2,m}
2) Voter V, sends his voting ticket to VS. VS performs
a total of 5 signature verifications needed for ticket
validation. The first 3 verification equations are as
follows
(AS × y) mod nAS ?= s
eAS
1 mod nAS
(AS × pr1 · q−1) mod nAS ?= s
eAS
2 mod nAS
(AS × pr2 · q−1) mod nAS ?= s
eAS
3 mod nAS
Notice that in virtue of the Chinese Residue Theorem
we have that pr1 · q−1 = l1 and pr2 · q−1 = l2, where
q−1 is defined as the multiplicative inverse of q modulus
nAS . Similarly r1 and r2 can be recovered by computing
pr1 ·n−1AS = r1 and pr2 ·n−1AS = r2, where n−1AS is defined
as the multiplicative inverse of nAS modulus q.
In order to verify the DSA signatures we use the
following procedure,
DSAverifier(r, s) {
w = s−1 mod q
u1 = w ·m mod q
u2 = r · w mod q
v = (αu1yu2 mod p) mod q
return v
}
Then the last two signatures s4 and s5 can be verified
by proving that the following equations hold:
r1
?
= DSAverifier(r1, s4)
r2
?
= DSAverifier(r2, s5)
3) If all five signatures are correctly verified, VS will accept
and store the ticket sent by the voter as a valid one. Once
that the voting election process has been completed VS
sends all valid votes that were received to TCS over the
communication network.
C. Counting phase
TCS must receive all valid tickets from the voting servers.
Additionally, TCS must identify all tickets that are identical
and count them only once. These actions will guarantee a final
tally equal to the total number of the valid votes received
during the elections.
In this phase it is possible to detect malicious voters that
may have sent two or more tickets with different votes. In
order to perform the so-called double voting detection, we
consider the fact that a given voter uses the same key to
sign different votes. Therefore, TCS will receive at least two
tickets with the following form:
B1 = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, y, pr1, pr2,m},
B2 = {s1, s2, s3, s′4, s′5, y, pr1, pr2,m′}.
With the information contained in these two tickets, TCS
is capable of identifying the voter who sent these ballots, by
computing the following equations:
x1 =
m′ −m
s′4 − s4
mod q,
x2 =
m′ −m
s′5 − s5
mod q,
k1 = x2 − x1, (8)
k2 = x1 − k1.
As it was mentioned previously, all k2 values assigned to
each voter are stored in the database of AS. In this way TCS
can request to AS the name of the voter which is associated
to the computed value k2, thus identifying the identity of the
malicious voter.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
SELES has been designed and implemented for medium
scale electronic elections, i.e., limited to several tenths of
thousands voters. The limit on the number of voters is mainly
imposed by the WEB server utilized in the implementation.
SELES functionality is based on the Client–Server paradigm.
At the same time, SELES makes use of several cryptographic
tools and techniques which provide a correct and secure
performance.
Voter’s functionality is provided by an application that we
have called Voter Application which was specifically designed
for this purpose. This application can run in a variety of
platforms such as Personal Computer, Laptops, or even a
Personal Digital Assistant (PDA).
Due to the fact that votes are emitted online, eligible users
of a given election can participate via either a wired or a
wireless Internet connection. The system’s general architecture
envisioned for SELES is shown in Fig.1.
Fig. 1: System’s General Architecture
Those participants working on high performance computers
(such as workstations or laptops) may cast their votes without
using a local application. Instead, all voter’s actions will be
accomplished by using signed applets previously downloaded
by the voter during his/her registration in the voting process.
Voters who wish to cast their ballots from a PDA device,
must download and install a Voter Application. We were forced
to develop that application because today PDA’s Internet
browsers support standard applets only and almost none of
them can deal with signed applets.
Fig. 2 shows a top-down layer model used for implementing
each one of the entities considered by our system. As it
was mentioned, SELES protocol defines three authorities,
namely, AS, VS y TCS. Additionally, a Certificate Authority
(CA) is also required. This authority needs to participate in
a preliminary phase, generating the RSA public/private key
pair for each participant. In this work, we considered that
all participants (voters and authorities) have a 1024-bit RSA
type of public/private key pair. Furthermore, the CA is also
Fig. 2: SELES Top-Down Layer Model
responsible of issuing the digital certificates corresponding to
each public key.
Once again and due to PDAs computing power limita-
tions, we faced some compatibility problems when trying
to read/access the private keys generated by our own CA
application ACERPAM. The reason for this problem is that
unfortunately crucial Java libraries are not included yet in
the Personal Java package, which is the typical Java virtual
machine available for PDA devices. Due to that, those users
wishing to generate and transmit a vote from a PDA device
must utilize public/private keys and certificates generated by
a cryptographic tool called keytool which is a utility included
in JDK 1.2.
A. Authentication Server
The Authentication Server (AS) is responsible for authen-
ticating all registered users wishing to vote. SELES considers
that a legitimate user is the one that has been correctly pre-
registered in the AS election database. Fig. 3 shows the
dataflow between a voter and the AS during the authentication
phase.
The authentication server is the entity in charge of receiv-
ing users’ digital certificates along with their personal data.
Afterwards, AS verifies the public identifier and the signature
it just received. Next step is to check whether the prospective
voter has been previously authenticated or not, i.e., if a blind
signature was previously granted to him/her or not. If the
answer is yes, then AS recovers the user’s unique identifier
value k2 from its database. On the other hand, if this is the
first time that the voter is establishing contact with the AS, a
unique value k2 is assigned to him and stored in the database
so that future identification of that user is possible. Finally, AS
blindly signs the corresponding values according to SELES
security protocol described in last Section. AS encrypts the
blind signatures along with the value k2 just generated and
the message time stamp. This information is encapsulated in
a message that will be sent to the voter later.
Fig. 3: Voter-AS UML Sequence Diagram
B. Voting Server
The Voting Server (VS) has the responsibility of accepting
participant’s ballots for a given election process. Received
ballots must contain:
1) vote selection The candidate selection chosen by the
participant,
2) Public Parameters Which are needed to verify two
digital signatures included in the vote and,
3) Five signatures According to SELES Security protocol,
three of those verified signatures are RSA signatures
while the other two are DSA signatures.
Fig. 4 shows the dataflow between a voter and the VS during
the voting phase. After the VS receives the ballot, it gets
AS public key which is required for verifying the first three
RSA signatures. If all the three RSA signatures get validated,
then the remaining two DSA signatures are verified. If all
five signatures are valid, then an automatic response message
is generated where the VS let the voter know that his/her
vote was correctly generated. However, if any one of the five
signatures fails, the response message informs that the ballot
has not been accepted.
C. Ticket Counting Server
The Ticket Counting Server (TCS) receives from VS all
registered tickets whose five signatures have passed the verifi-
cation step. Fig. 5 shows the corresponding dataflow between
VS and TCS. Obviously, TCS’ main responsibility is of
counting all tickets in a fair and exact manner.
To do that, TCS first stores all received ballots in its
database. Then, it proceeds to identify all identical ballots
so that they will be considered only once during the final
counting.
The same procedure is instrumented for detecting duplicated
tickets that may have being sent by malicious voters. In
Fig. 4: Voter-VS UML Sequence Diagram
the case that some suspicious tickets are found, TCS must
obtain the corresponding identifiers and report them back
to AS. Afterwards, AS will extract the cheaters’ identity
corresponding to those reported identifiers. Fig. 6 shows the
dataflow between TCS and AS.
Only after having analyzed all received tickets, TCS pro-
ceeds to perform the final counting followed by the publication
of the official results. By performing these actions, SELES
system guarantees a final tally equal to the total number of the
valid votes received during the election process. Finally and in
an effort to bring transparency to the system, TCS publishes a
detailed list of all valid and invalid tickets that were received
during the process.
Fig. 5: VS-TCS UML Sequence Diagram
Fig. 6: TCS-AS UML Sequence Diagram
D. Voter
In order to be able to cast a vote, a participant must complete
two phases;
1) Authentication Phase: During this phase the voter sends
his/her digital certificate and personal data to AS. To do
so, the voter first obtains AS public key and prepares and
signs the message that AS must blindly sign. When the
voter receives the response message from AS it needs
to parse it so that the value k2 generated by AS, (let
us recall that this value is the voter’s unique identifier)
can be obtained along with the three blind signatures.
Thereafter, the voter can remove the blind factor and
store the parameters contained in the response message.
2) Voting Phase: At the beginning of this phase, the partici-
pant fills out a ticket with his/her own electoral candidate
selections. Afterwards the participant must digitally sign
the ticket using the DSA cryptosystem and send it to the
VS. Then, VS will proceed to check whether that ticket
is valid or not. In case of a positive result, VS sends
an OK message back to the voter, otherwise the voter
receives an error message. If everything goes well the
voter hashes the ticket and stores it together with ticket’s
relevant parameters.
It is worth to mention that when election’s final tally is
published, any legal voter can make sure that his/her vote was
actually counted. This check can be done by any legal voter
in a simple manner: he/she just need to check that the hash of
his/her ticket is included among all tickets listed by TCS.
In order to prevent typical package losses over Internet,
SELES makes use of time stamps and safe storage of ticket’
relevant parameters. In this way SELES achieves some degree
of robustness.
E. Implementation Details
All three authorities were implemented using Servlets and
JSP’s. The Voter application was coded in Java using J2SDK
version 1.4.1 02.
The PDA version of the Voter application was written using
the execution environment Insignia JeodeRuntime, which is
fully compatible with PDA Personal Java. The PDAs used
in this work were: HP iPAQ Pocket PC model h5500, and
a SHARP model Zaurus SL-5500, with operating system
Windows and Linux, respectively. Let us remark that exactly
the same Voter application code runs in both PDA devices in
spite of the platform differences.
The WEB server utilized was Apache Tomcat version 5.0.2.
Finally, the database management was coded using MySQL
version 1.4 and MySQL Control Center 0.8.9-beta as graphic
user interface for MySQL.
V. EVALUATION
A. Functionality
The scheme proposed in this paper has the following
properties:
TABLE I: Desired Properties
SCHEME ACCURACY DEMOCR. PRIVACY VERIFIC. CONVEN. FLEXIB. DV-DET.
Schoenmakers [14] √ √ √ √ √ × ×
Fujioka et al. [4] √ √ √ √ × √ ×
Sensus [2] √ √ √ √ √ √ ×
Karro et al. [9] √ √ √ √ √ √ ×
REVS [7] √ √ √ √ √ √ ×
SELES
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
1) Accuracy: SELES security protocol guarantees that only
valid tickets will be counted in the final results, since
VS will not accept any ticket that does not contain the
3 signatures issued by the AS. Moreover, a procedure
has been included in the protocol to detect whenever
two or more valid tickets are issued by the same voter.
2) Democracy: This property is achieved because AS will
verify the identity of a voter, checking that he/she meets
all requirements to participate in an election.
3) Privacy: With the use of blind signatures it is guaranteed
that given a vote, it is not possible to determine whose
person voted.
4) Verification: Since every ticket issued contains 5 digital
signatures (3 realized with the keys chosen by a voter
and 2 user keys generated between the voter and the AS),
and the unencrypted vote (m), voters may verify that
their vote was correctly counted whenever the results of
an election are published. This is possible because TCS
not only publishes final results, but also all the valid
tickets that were received.
5) Convenience: Voters are capable of finishing the voting
process in short time, during a single session and with
minimum equipment.
6) Flexibility: The system is flexible because it is based on
blind signatures, which allows the use of several formats
for the voting ticket.
7) Detection of 2 or more votes issued by a single voter:
SELES protocol is able to detect whether a voter has
issued two or more votes, additionally of being capable
of knowing the identity of a malicious voter.
B. Comparison
Table I shows a comparison among some of the most well
known e-voting schemes. Properties considered include: accu-
racy, democracy, privacy, verification, convenience, flexibility
and double voting detection, respectively.
Table II shows a comparison between some of the protocols
listed in Table I, in terms of the total number of keys
pairs, passwords and authorities required by those protocols.
Additionally, we compare the number of times that a vote is
sent through the network in the voting phase. In Table II, N is
TABLE II: Comparative Table
SCHEME KEYS PASSWORD AUTH. TRANSM.
Sensus [2] 1 + N 1 3 3N
Karro et al [10] 1 + kN 0 6 3N
REVS [7] 2 + iN t 3 + i 2N
This Protocol 1 + 2N 1 3 N
the number of votes sent in a given election. In the case of the
REVS protocol, t corresponds to a value greater than i2 , where
i is the number of Administrative entities that are participating
in an election. Finally in the case of Karro’s protocol, k is the
value of key pairs that the Counting authority decides to issue.
The authority must issue a number of encrypted tickets greater
than the number of registered voters, using different keys.
The number and size of exchanged messages transferred
during both, authentication and voting phase are summarized
in Table III
TABLE III: Aproximate size of messages
PHASE MESSAGE 1 MESSAGE 2
Authentication 19.5Kb 4.5Kb
Voting 06.7Kb —
A summary of the cryptographic operations performed all
along the election process is shown in Table IV
TABLE IV: Cryptographic Operations
PHASE V AS VS
Authentication 1 RSA sign. 1 RSA verif.
2 RSA encryp. 4 RSA encryp.
3 blind sign.
Voting 4 RSA decryp. 3 RSA verif.
2 DSA sign. 2 DSA verif.
TOTAL 9 operations 8 operations 5 operations
Finally in Fig 7 we show SELES execution time needed for
election’s tally computation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this contribution we presented the design and imple-
mentation of SELES, an end-to-end electronic election system
solution. SELES security and privacy features are provided by
a secure communication protocol which is an improved version
of the Lin-Hwang-Chang’s scheme [10]. SELES’ performance
was tested and measured using a client-server model imple-
mented over a heterogeneous distributed system comprised
of workstations, laptops and PDA devices interacting through
wired and wireless Internet connections. A comparative analy-
sis among reported e-voting systems shows that SELES is
a competitive option able to fulfill all desirable properties
of a secure election system, such as accuracy, democracy,
verification, convenience, flexibility and detection of double
voting. Furthermore, our experiments also show that SELES
is able to obtain a final exact tally of up to five thousand votes
in less than 140 Seconds.
Fig. 7: Time required for Tally Computation during the Voting Phase
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